# The Analysis of Knowledge

> 【EN】For any person, there are some things they know, and some things they don’t. What exactly is the difference? What does it take to know something? It’s not enough just to believe it—we don’t know the things we’re wrong about. Knowledge seems to be more like a way of getting at the truth. The analysis of knowledge concerns the attempt to articulate in what exactly this kind of “getting at the truth” consists. More particularly, the project of analysing knowledge is to state conditions that are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for propositional knowledge, thoroughly answering the question: “What does it take to know something?” By “propositional knowledge”, we mean knowing that something is the case , i.e., knowledge of a proposition. For example, if Susan knows that Alyssa is a musician, she has knowledge of the proposition that Alyssa is a musician. … 【中】词条讨论知识的分析，即尝试说明知道某件事究竟由什么构成。仅仅相信并不够，因为我们对弄错的事情并无知识；知识更像是一种把握真理的方式。文章依次考察作为“辩护的真信念”的三元分析、真与信念两个条件、内在主义与外在主义、辩护的种类、轻薄的知识，以及针对三元分析的反例、无假前提条件与敏感性等模态条件。

- ID: m13231
- Category: culture
- Domain: 认识论

## Definition

对任何人而言，有些事他知道，有些事他不知道，差别究竟何在？仅仅相信还不够——我们并不“知道”自己弄错的事。知识更像是一种通达真理的方式，而知识的分析，就是要把这种通达究竟由什么构成说清楚。 脚手架作用：- 知识判定：用真、信念与反运气三条件逐项筛查声称的知识。 - 运气剔除：构造相近的可能情形，检验真信念是否出于侥幸。 - 条件设计：为具体领域选择辩护、敏感或安全等第三条件。

## How it works

知识分析沿着“真 + 信念 + 第三个条件”展开。真排除错误，信念排除无心的状态，但二者相加仍可能有出于运气的真信念，于是需要第三个条件来消除运气：或要求辩护，或要求无虚假的前提，或要求信念对事实敏感，即若事实不成立就不会如此相信。

## Practice

1) 检验候选案例是否满足真与信念两个条件；2) 构造“真但出于运气”的例子，看候选分析是否误判为知识；3) 若误判，追问缺的是辩护、无假前提还是模态条件；4) 反复调整第三个条件，直到覆盖各类反例。

## Use

- 知识判定：用真、信念与反运气三条件逐项筛查声称的知识。 - 运气剔除：构造相近的可能情形，检验真信念是否出于侥幸。 - 条件设计：为具体领域选择辩护、敏感或安全等第三条件。

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