# 哲学僵尸论证

> 【EN】Zombies in philosophy are imaginary creatures designed to illuminate problems about consciousness and its relation to the physical world. Unlike the ones in films or witchcraft, they are exactly like us in all physical respects but without conscious experiences: by definition there is ‘nothing it is like’ to be a zombie. Yet zombies behave just like us, and some even spend a lot of time discussing consciousness. Few people, if any, think zombies actually exist. But many hold they are at least conceivable, and some that they are possible. It seems that if zombies really are possible, then physicalism is false and some kind of dualism is true. For many philosophers that is the chief importance of the zombie idea. But it is also valuable for the stimulus and focus it gives to wider philosophical theorizing about consciousness and other aspects of the mind. … 【中】词条指出，几乎无人认为僵尸真实存在，但许多人认为它们至少是可设想的，有人更认为它们是可能的。若僵尸真的可能，物理主义就是假的，某种二元论为真。词条讨论僵尸观念本身、它与物理主义的关系、为其可能性辩护的可设想性论证、反对可设想性的论证、现象概念策略、罗素式一元论及其他反驳，并涉及心理因果等问题。

- ID: m13341
- 分类: learn
- 领域: 认知科学

## 定义

哲学僵尸是为阐明意识及其与物理世界关系而设想的生物：它们在一切物理方面与我们完全相同，却没有意识经验，即作为它是什么样这回事根本不存在；但它们的行为与我们无异，甚至也大谈意识。 脚手架作用：- 设想检验：检验能否无矛盾地设想物理相同却无意识的情形。 - 推论审查：追问可设想是否足以推出可能性，防止跳跃。 - 解释鸿沟：借此看清物理描述与现象体验之间还剩什么。

## 机制

论证的力量来自可设想性到可能性的推论：若能无矛盾地设想一个物理上与我们完全相同却无意识的生物，意识便似乎不被物理事实决定。物理主义者反驳说这并不可靠，那只是现象概念与物理概念在认知上彼此独立。

## 练习

1) 明确模态主张：僵尸是可设想还是可能；2) 检验从可设想性到可能性的推论是否成立；3) 考察现象概念策略能否解释相关直觉。

## 脚手架用法

- 设想检验：检验能否无矛盾地设想物理相同却无意识的情形。 - 推论审查：追问可设想是否足以推出可能性，防止跳跃。 - 解释鸿沟：借此看清物理描述与现象体验之间还剩什么。

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